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Abstract
Background: Evolution of cooperative behaviour is widely studied in different models where interaction is 
heterogeneous, although static among individuals. However, in nature individuals can often recognize each other and 
chose, besides to cooperate or not, to preferentially associate with or to avoid certain individuals.
Here we consider a dynamical interaction graph, in contrast to a static one. We propose several rules of rejecting
unwanted partners and seeking out new ones, and study the probability of emergence and maintenance of cooperation
on these dynamic networks.
Results: Our simulations reveal that cooperation can evolve and be stable in the population if we introduce 
preferential linking, even if defectors can perform it too. The fixation of cooperation has higher probability than that of 
on static graphs, and this effect is more prevalent at high benefit to cost ratios. We also find an optimal number of 
partners, for which the fixation probability of cooperation shows a maximum.
Conclusions: The ability to recognize, seek out or avoid interaction partners based on the outcome of past interactions 
has an important effect on the emergence of cooperation. Observations about the number of partners in natural 
cooperating groups are in concordance with the result of our model.
Background
Evolution of cooperation and altruism remains one of the
most intensively studied problems of evolutionary biology
[1,2]. On the one hand, the interest is based on the fact that
cooperation between competing entities to form a larger,
more complex unit played a central role in all the major
transitions in evolution [3]. On the other hand, the evolution
of altruistic or cooperative acts seems to be a notoriously
hard problem, which has provided a challenge for decades.
To explain the evolution of cooperation one has to answer
the following questions: 1. How can a cooperative (altruis-
tic) act spread in a population where originally only defec-
tors existed? 2. How is the spread of cheaters (agents that
enjoy the benefit of cooperation, but don't invest into it)
hindered in a population of cooperative individuals?
There are several factors listed which play a central role
in the evolution and stability of cooperation [2]. While kin
selection is an important mechanism responsible for the
evolution of altruistic and cooperative behaviour [4], there
are cases when kinship among cooperators or reciprocal
altruist is probably too low to explain these behaviours (e.g.
[5-15], etc.). The general theoretical framework for study-
ing cooperation of unrelated individuals is the Prisoner's
Dilemma (PD) game [16], in which partners can choose
either a selfish (defective) or a cooperative strategy. If both
partners defect, they get a smaller fitness (P) than if both
cooperate (R), but a defector gets an even higher fitness
value when its opponent cooperates (T). However, the
cooperator receives the smallest fitness of all if its opponent
is a defector (S). Consequently, although mutual coopera-
tion would result in a higher fitness, defection is the only
evolutionarily stable state in this model. Defectors can
invade and destroy cooperation in a cooperative population
while cooperators cannot spread in a defective population
[16,17]. Thus in this situation it remains challenging to
explain the emergence and stability of cooperation.
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Page 2 of 10Nowak and May [18] examined a spatial version of the
PD game by placing individuals on the nodes of a rectangu-
lar grid. Individuals, which can be either defectors or coop-
erators, can interact only with their nearest neighbours.
Payoffs and thus their relative fitnesses are computed
according to the PD game. The same individuals are in
competition for empty places, and the success of competi-
tion is proportional to the relative fitness of an individual.
They found that cooperative and defective strategies persist
in stable coexistence if the benefit (b) of the altruistic act
divided by its cost (c) ratio is high enough. This polymorph
equilibrium of cooperators and defectors is the consequence
of limited interaction range among the individuals and lim-
ited dispersal as well [19] (but see [20] for an alternative
explanation using kin selection).
Grid (regular graph) models are adequate only for sessile
organisms or if spatial arrangement of animals also strongly
correlates with their associations and/or rank (e.g. [21,22]).
However interaction topologies are far from regular graphs
in most cases (i.e. individuals don't necessary have the same
number of partners, nor are they arranged in the special
topology of a regular graph).
For example small world social network structures were
found for bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops sp.) [23], three-
spined stickleback (Gasterosteus aculeatus) [24,25] and
guppies (Poecilia reticulata) [26]. Human social network is
also far from a regular graph, as was found for example for
an instant messaging network [27], an e-mail network [28]
or a scientific collaboration network [29,30].
The study of the evolution and maintenance of coopera-
tive behaviour has recently shifted to employ non-regular
graphs. While cooperative strategy survives only if benefit/
cost ratio is high for regular graphs [18,31], it dominates for
degree heterogeneous graphs (i.e. when individuals can
have different number of partners) even if benefit/cost ratio
is close to one [32-36]. It is important to note however, that
the positive effect of degree heterogeneous graphs on the
evolution of cooperation is valid only if the total payoff of
an individual is computed as the sum of payoffs received by
its neighbours. If payoffs are normalised by the edges then
degree heterogeneous graphs behave similar to degree
homogeneous graphs (e.g. regular graphs) [37-39]. Simi-
larly, the results are sensitive to the update rule, that is to
the rule how local competition, birth and death events are
achieved [31]. Finally, cooperators and defectors are pres-
ent with the same frequency initially in the above men-
tioned studies, thus these works are focused rather on the
stability of cooperative strategies assuming that somehow it
become abundant previously, but don't deal with the inva-
sion of cooperators in a population of defectors.
Other recent works focused on the fixation probability of
a single cooperator among defectors in different networks
[40,41]. Ohtsuki et al. [31] have shown that if they use the
so called "death-birth" update rule (details see below) then
selection favours cooperation (i.e. the average fixation
probability of a single cooperator is higher than the fixation
probability of a neutral mutant) in the PD game if the b/c
ratio exceeds the average number of neighbours in the net-
work (k), that is, if b/c > k. They found this relation to be
approximately valid in populations of different structure, in
which interaction topology is described variously by regu-
lar, random regular, random, or scale-free graphs. Taylor et
al. [41] have proved mathematically that this relation is
approximately valid for bi-transitive graphs.
As we emphasized above, the evolutionary stability of
cooperation is increased in graph heterogeneous networks
[33], while the average probability of invasion of it depends
mainly on the average number of neighbours [31,41].
Although this difference seems to be a contradiction, there
is a rather simple intuitive explanation of it. If half of the
nodes are occupied by cooperators initially then on average
half of the hubs are occupied by cooperators as well. These
hubs are the core of the spread of cooperators, since if a hub
and a sufficient number of its neighbours are occupied by
cooperators then its defecting neighbours could not invade
this node. If the invasion probability of cooperators is stud-
ied then a single cooperator is placed to a randomly selected
node which can have different number of edges according
to the edge distribution of the network. Fixation probability
of a single cooperator increases linearly with edge number
of the node (Kun and Scheuring unpublished and [35]), thus
the average fixation probability is proportional to the aver-
age number of neighbours.
Another feature of the original spatial games is the static
nature of the interaction topology. However interaction net-
work are seldom static. Many animals live in fission-fusion
societies (African elephants, Loxodonta africana [42,43];
bottlenose dolphins, Tursiops sp., [44,45]; spotted hyena,
Crocuta crocuta, [46]; chimpanzee, Pan sp., [47]; northern
bottlenose whales, Hyperoodon ampullatus, [48]; spider
monkeys, Ateles geoffroyi [49]), where small groups/indi-
viduals join and separate iteratively. Besides the above
mentioned evidences, associations are non-random in a
number of other systems as well (e.g. [25,50-52]). While a
simple foraging model can produce non-random association
between individuals [53], it is clear that certain animals can
very well choose with whom they want to associate. One
intriguing example is found in bottlenose dolphins, where
individuals can associate with different other individuals
for different tasks (foraging, rest, social activity, travel)
[54]. This implies that they can form associations based on
with whom can they perform a certain act better.
As animals can recognize each other [55,56], there is a
possibility to interact only with selected individuals. With
respect to cooperation this can have the effect of coopera-
tors preferentially attach to other cooperators, and shy away
from defectors. For example, dominant female hyenas
offered more food and coalition support to closely associ-
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and defense [7]. Moreover they can discern relative rank
[57], thus have the mental capacity to make choices
assumed in the presented model.
In the light of field observations, it is becoming increas-
ingly important to study the evolution of cooperation on
dynamical networks. Some recent studies focused on the
fixation probability of a single cooperator among defectors
in the case when graph dynamics is much faster than
dynamics of evolution [58,59]. In these works individuals
differ in the rate at which they seek a new link. The linking
dynamics slightly transforms the payoff matrix, in a way
which favours the fixation probability of the cooperative
strategy if the life-span of links among cooperators is high
enough compared to the life-span of links among coopera-
tors and defectors. In other studies where the relative speed
of graph and evolutionary dynamics are varied systemati-
cally it is assumed that cooperators and defectors initially
are in the same fraction in the population [60,61]. It is
found that random relinking is detrimental to the coopera-
tive strategy [62], while preferential link dynamics helps
cooperators to prevail in the population [63-67].
Experimental evidences in this field are few and unclear.
Croft et al. [26] found that guppies reduce cooperative aid
to partners that defected in the recent past, however no such
behaviour was detected in another experiment [68].
We know that mere random network dynamic decreases
the fixation probability of a single cooperator among defec-
tors, simply because random relinking dilutes the coopera-
tors' associations [69]. This case will serve as a control for
our investigation.
The aim of this study is twofold. First, we advance our
understanding of the evolution of cooperation on dynamical
graphs. Here we study how preferential association can
affect the fixation probability of a single cooperator among
defectors. We compare three different strategies of partner
choice/partner rejection: "Random choice" refers to the
case when the focal individual chooses to reject a defecting
associate, and chooses a new associate randomly. The strat-
egy "Get rid of defectors" allows the new partner to choose
which of its associate to reject. The last strategy "The friend
of my friend is my friend" is based on triadic closure, which
is an important mechanism in the dynamic of social net-
works [70]. In this case individuals try to associate with
associates of trustworthy partners. To study the role of part-
ner choice strategies independently from network topology
our defined strategies keep the networks structures intact.
(Schematic representation of these strategies are shown on
Fig. 1)
Second, we would like to review and synthesize the
experimental data available on animal societies with the
recent works on games on dynamical graphs. The main-
stream literature on evolutionary game theory, while build-
ing more and more sophisticated models, has mostly
ignored the vast literature on animal behaviour. This is
unfortunate as there is a wealth of information available
which can make theoretical models more realistic and/or
the results more relevant to biology. By comparing and dis-
cussing our models in the light of observations and experi-
ments we can in turn hope that empirical researchers will
test our and others hypotheses and/or provide us with valu-
able data for models.
Results
Observations show that preferential attachment generally
benefits cooperators (Fig 2). The fixation probability of the
cooperative strategy increases with higher probability of
preferential linking (higher ω2). As Fig 2 demonstrates
cooperative strategy fixates with lower probability when
linking is non-selective. Preferential linking can counter-
balance it, and the fixation probability can be much higher
than observed for a static network. In case of small b prefer-
ential attachment can increase fixation probability above
the referential fixation probability of a neutral mutant in a
well mixed population, thus cooperation can spread, where
Figure 1 Three rules for assortative partner choice. Schematic rep-
resentation of the different assortative linking. (a) Random choice; (b) 
Get rid of defectors; (c) The friend of my friend is my friend. Black filled 
circle represents the focal individual. Gray filled circles represent defec-
tors; circles with a crossed line represent cooperators; and open circle 
represent an individual with arbitrary strategy.
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Page 4 of 10without such preferential attachment it could not (see Fig
2).
Preferential attachment increases the fixation probability
of cooperation more if the relative benefit of cooperation
(b/c) is higher or when the mean connectivity k is higher.
Even at lower benefit of cooperation assortative linking can
increase the fixation probability to a higher level than
expected for a neutral mutant. With high benefit, coopera-
tion would fixate more probably than a neutral mutant even
without preferential attachment, but preferential attachment
reinforces the evolution of cooperation (compare open vs.
solid symbols on Fig 2).
Introduction of more complex relinking rules ("Get rid of
defectors" and "The friend of my friend is my friend") (Fig
1b-c) enhances cooperation further. We know from the liter-
ature [31], that if the benefit (b) can be expressed as b =
nk, where n is an integer number, then the fixation proba-
bility is lower for higher k at static graphs (at least in the k
= 2-10 range). However, fixation probability increases more
with higher k, and surpasses the case with lower k for
dynamical graphs (filled symbols in Fig 2).
Fig 3 shows that there is a k where the fixation probabil-
ity is maximal. We have found that this optimal average
connectivity is about 14-18.
In the next series of numerical experiments we have inter-
polated the points where the fixation probability is 1/N, the
probability of fixation of a neutral mutant in a well-mixed
population. Simulations were carried out with ω2 kept con-
stant, and b varied with 0.5 increments (sometimes finer
increment is used). The interpolation was done from at least
3 points both above and below the 0.01 probability line (for
N = 100). The points obtained for the different relinking
regimes divide up the parameter space where cooperation
can fixate (to the right and up from the point) and where it
could not (bottom left corner) (Fig 4).
It can bee seen from Fig 4 that even the simplest random
search for other cooperating partners results in a widening
parameter space, where cooperation can fixate more effec-
tively than a neutral mutant could. Thus higher probability
of preferential linking can lead to cooperation in cases,
where otherwise cooperation cannot be attained. Also coop-
eration can evolve at lower probability of preferential link-
ing for the "Get rid of defectors" and "The friend of my
friend is my friend" rules than for the random choice relink-
ing rule. That is, spread of cooperation is possible at even
lower values of b, if more complex relinking rules are used.
When we allow defectors to avoid other defectors (PAV-
LOV scenario) we observe decreasing fixation probability
of cooperators as the probability of preferential linking
increases (Fig 5). Thus when search for new partner is ran-
dom, assortative partner choice only promotes cooperation
when defectors are not allowed to do the same (compare
Fig 5a with Fig 2a). More sophisticated relinking rules
however give back qualitatively the same results as above
(compare Fig 2b-c with Fig 5b-c), thus even if defectors
could avoid their own ilk or try to interact with their coop-
erative partner's other partners, cooperative behaviour has
an increasing probability of fixation with increasing assor-
tativeness. These results also serve as a robustness check
for our model, as this assumption does not affect our main
results.
Figure 2 Fixation probability of cooperators as a function of the assortativeness of partner choice. In each case cooperation is promoted for 
some proportion of the ω2 parameter range compared to random. Squares k = 4; circles k = 8. Filled symbols b = k, open symbols b = 2 k . c = 1, 
ω1 = 0.05 and w = 0.01 in all cases. The stand alone points represent the case when there is no network dynamics, i.e. ω1 = ω2 = 0.0. Dotted horizontal 
line represents the line above which cooperators fixate with higher than random probability.
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We have shown that preferential attachment promotes the
evolution of cooperation in graphs where relinking rules
were defined to keep the degree distribution constant. A
behaviour that allows cooperators to recognize cheaters,
and then avoid interaction with such individuals can facili-
tate the evolution of cooperation in otherwise unfavourable
circumstances (Fig 2). This scenario seems to assume that
cooperators have higher mental capabilities as only cooper-
ators can recognise exploitation and avoid it (note that
cooperators cannot distinguish defectors before interacting
with them), but defectors cannot do the same. We have
investigated a model setup where both cooperators and
defectors were allowed to reconsider their interactions.
Except for random choice (Fig 5), the possibility of partner
choice increases the fixation probability of cooperators
even in this case.
Fixation probability shows a maximum as a function of
average connectivity. The intuitive explanation of this result
is the following: at low connectivity, a cooperator cluster
can easily break up when a defector replaces a cooperator,
and dilutes the beneficial effect of cooperator aggregation.
However at high connectivity, the invasion of one defector
into a cooperator cluster causes only a minor loss to the sur-
rounding cooperators, as they have many other cooperator
neighbours. Furthermore, with preferential relinking, the
invasion of the defector is generally only temporary as
cooperators are working on avoiding it, especially with rule
3 of preferential linking ("The friend of my friend is my
friend"). One has a higher chance to find a new cooperator
neighbour when one has multiple cooperator neighbours. In
contrast, as k increases, the fixation probability of cooper-
ation decreases [31], because the chance for the emergence
of cooperator clusters decreases. So while it is easier to
purify cooperator aggregations when the connectivity is
higher, the detrimental effect of high k soon overtakes this
Figure 3 Fixation probability of cooperation shows an optimum 
at medium connectedness/association sizes with preferential at-
tachment rules. Fixation probability of cooperation with different 
rules for preferential attachment at different average connectivity. 
Squares represent random relinking; circles "Get rid of defectors"; and 
triangles "The friend of my friend is my friend". Filled symbols represent 
b = k and open symbols b = 2k. c = 1, ω1 = 0.05, ω2 = 0.95, w = 0.01 
and in all cases.
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Figure 4 Areas of the parameter space where cooperation can fixate with higher than random probability. The areas of cooperator and de-
fector dominance with different relinking rules. Sophisticated relinking rules extend the region where cooperation becomes dominant. The parameter 
space is shown for the benefit of cooperation (b) vs. the assortatitvity (ω2) a. k = 4, b. k = 8. c = 1, ω1 = 0.05 and w = 0.01 in all cases. Squares random 
relinking; circles "Get rid of defectors"; triangles "The friend of my friend is my friend". A bold letter D shows the area where defectors dominate and a 
bold letter C where cooperators dominate.
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Page 6 of 10advantage. The result of these two effects determines the
shape of the fixation probability function.
We note here that the defined relinking rules are so called
partner swapping rules which is not very effective against
defectors. The consequence of the rule is that a selectively
aborted defector definitely has a chance to parasite a new
cooperative partner. So our relinking rule is not very effec-
tive to oust defectors from the society. However, coopera-
tion associations can form, which associations can be
exploited by defectors only temporarily, thus the detrimen-
tal effect of defectors on cooperators is only marginal com-
pared to that of solitary cooperators.
While the fact that there is a maximum in the fixation
probability as a function of the mean connectivity is intui-
tive, the value where the maximum appears is not trivial.
We found that the fixation probability is maximal at around
k. Thus an individual interacts on a long term with around
14-18 other individuals. Interestingly we find rather similar
association sizes in cooperative species (Table 1). We do
not claim that group size and connectivity are solely
affected by the benefit of cooperation. Indeed, group sizes
are affected by a great variety of ecological factors. For
example, groups of birds benefit from increased vigilance if
groups size is larger, as each individual has to be on sentry
for less amount of time, but interference competition puts a
limit on the size of the group [71]. Another interesting
example is that wolves not necessarily infer foraging bene-
fit from group living [72], but larger group can defend the
captured prey from scavenging ravens more efficiently
[73]. Recently, Voelkl and Kasper [74] have shown that the
social network of some 70 primate groups facilitates the
spread of cooperation. Thus we find the similarities
between the levels of connectivity of real social networks of
animals and the optimal connectivity found in our model
suggestive.
We note that long term association or connectivity should
not be confused with group (clan, herd, etc.) size. The two
can be very different as group sizes can be much larger than
presented in Table 1 for connectivity values. For example,
observed group size of chimpanzees have a mean of 55, and
a maximum of 120 [47]. However, foraging and patrol par-
ties are of size 5-7 [75]. This translates to average connec-
tivity of 4-6 during patrol.
We have assumed that individuals associate for a long
time, and while a few changes in partnership within one's
life are possible, the network dynamics is comparable to the
life cycle of the modeled organisms. Association times are
commonly bimodal, as most of the associations last for a
short time, and there is some very long-term association
(e.g. [50,76,77]). Association between bottlenose dolphins
can last for 20 years [44], albeit 7-8 years is more common
[23] (they live for about 10-25 years, with maximum of 40-
50; [78]). Bottlenose whales usually associate for only a
field season, but there is some long term (1-2 years) associ-
ation between males. Roughly half of the associations of
Spix's disc-winged bats last for 150-420 days, and some up
to 4 years [76]. One extreme is observed in small, isolated
communities, where stable associations only change with
birth and death, as observed for a population of Spinner
dolphins (Stenella longirostis) [79]. One can safely argue,
that these long term associations have a larger impact on
individual's fitness than the shorter ones, thus our model
can capture the relevant time scales for network dynamics
observed for certain group living species in nature.
Figure 5 "Win-stay - loose-relink wisely". Fixation probability of cooperators as a function of probability of preferential linking in the PAVLOV sce-
nario. In the PAVLOV scenario, defectors are allowed to seek new partners like cooperators, but preferential relinking still promotes cooperation. In the 
case of random relinking rule however cooperation is unfavoured. Squares k = 4; circles k = 8. Filled symbols b = k, open symbols b = 2 k . c = 1, 
ω1 = 0.05 and w = 0.01 in all cases. The stand alone points represent the case when there is no network dynamics, i.e. ω1 = ω2 = 0.0. Dotted horizontal 
line represents the line above which cooperators fixate with higher than random probability.
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Page 7 of 10There are some studies where the topology of the interac-
tion (as opposed to links, as here) was allowed to change
[80,81].
One possible extension of our model can investigate the
effect of multi-tiered social organizations. Social grouping
have many levels in a number of species, for example in
zebras, where males with harems group for mutual defense
[82]; and similar social composition was found in Yunnan
snub-nosed monkeys (Rhinopithecus bieti) [83]. Further-
more dolphins [44,45] and African elephants [43] also have
multi-tiered social organization.
Conclusions
We have shown that preferential attachment can increase
the probability of the fixation of cooperative strategies, and
this probability, contrary to what is observed for static inter-
action networks, is the highest at intermediate level of con-
nectedness. This result is robust independently of how the
details of preferential linking are defined and valid in a
wide parameter space. The assumptions of our model fits
the observations made for real word populations and would
explain the higher connectedness of cooperating individuals
observed in nature (Table 1). Interestingly the observed
group sizes in real word populations appear to be close to
the optimal connectedness in our model, where cooperation
is easiest to maintain/achieve.
Methods
Here we considered a population where the interactions are
described by a scale-free graph that can vary in time. Scale-
free networks were generated according to the method of
preferential attachment [84,85]). The population of individ-
uals consisted of defectors and cooperators. An individual
derived its payoff, P from interactions with adjacent indi-
viduals. A cooperator provides help to all individuals to
whom it is connected, thus it pays a cost (c) for each of its
interaction. Neigbours of a cooperator receive the benefit
(b). Generally, if a cooperator is connected to k other indi-
viduals and i of those are cooperators, then its payoff is bi -
ck. A defector does not provide any help, and therefore its
interaction has no costs. However, it still receives the bene-
fit from neighbouring cooperators, thus if a defector is con-
nected to j cooperators, then its payoff is bj. The fitness of a
player i is, 1 + w + wPi, where w measures the intensity of
the selection and Pi is the payoff of the player. Here we
assumed weak selection where the payoff is small com-
pared to the baseline fitness (w < < 1).
We employed a "death-birth" updating scheme based on
previous studies (e.g. [31,86]), where at each update a ran-
domly chosen individual dies; and subsequently its neigh-
bours compete for the empty site in proportion to their
fitnesses. Accordingly, the probability that neighbour i
Table 1: Connectivities in animal societies
Species Connectivity1 Ref.
Ring-tailed coatis (Nasua nasue) 15.3 ± 6.1 [91]
Ring-tailed coatis (Nasua nasue) 17.0 ± 3.2 and 10.2 ± 1.3 [92]
Three-spined stickleback (Gasterosteus 
aculeatus)
14 ± 11 [24]
Three-spined stickleback (Gasterosteus 
aculeatus)
28.2 [25]
Bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops sp.) 4.97 [93]
Bottlenose whales (Hyperoodon 
ampullatus)
4.17 [48]
Long-finned pilot whales (Globicephala 
melas)
11-12 [50]
Killer whales (Orcinus orca) 2.05 [94]
Spix's disc-winged bat (Thyroptera tricolor) 2.9-3.4 [76]
Guppy (Poecilia reticulata) 14.7 [26]
Guppy (Poecilia reticulata) 14.7; 17.3; 21.9; 22.7 [25]
Grevy's zebra (Equus grevyi) 7.08 [82]
Onager (Equus hemionus) 10.75 [82]
1 Connectivity was either recorded from an interaction network, or inferred from measurement of association patterns.
Kun et al. BMC Evolutionary Biology 2010, 10:173
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2148/10/173
Page 8 of 10occupies the emptied site is  where the fitness of
all neighbours are summed. We note here that the success of
the cooperative strategy critically depends on the applied
update rule and death-birth scheme is the most beneficial
update rule for the evolution of cooperation [19,31,86].
The interaction network was allowed to change in the fol-
lowing way. At each update we chose a node randomly. We
tested each link of this node, whether they would change or
not according to given probabilities, which probability is
independent of the past action, and only depends on the
composition of the current interaction neighbourhood. If
the focal player is a cooperator and a link connects it to a
defector, then the probability of changing that link is ω2 and
ω1 otherwise. Probability ω1 refers to the basic speed of
relinking in the population, assuming that ω2 > ω1 means
that cooperators selectively shun links with defectors to
avoid exploitation, thus ω2 measures the probability of pref-
erential linking. Individuals have no memory, thus a prefer-
entially aborted connection could be relinked later by
chance.
Consequently, we study the spread of a mutant strategy
which cooperates and tends to avoid defectors at the same
time (ω2 > ω1). Thus here we assumed that only cooperators
are allowed to avoid defectors with a higher probability.
Alternatively we also considered the case when not only
cooperators are allowed to avoid defectors with increased
probability. In these simulations any individual connecting
to a defector had a higher probability of relinking. This
strategy is similar to the PAVLOV strategy [87] of "win
stay, lose shift".
In order to keep the global degree distribution unchanged,
we used a specific rule for relinking. The edge between the
focal site and a selected neighbour was exchanged with the
edge connecting the chosen site to one of its neighbours.
For example, if A to B, and C to D, were connected origi-
nally, then after the update, A is connected to C, and B is
connected to D. The exchange is allowed only if the new
graph remains connected (i.e. there is a path from every
node to every other node), and none of the new connections
would connect individuals that are already connected.
Because the number of edges belonging to a site never
changes, the edge distribution of the graphs remain
unchanged [88-90].
We investigated three scenarios, which differed in the
selection of the edges to be changed, that is different prefer-
ential relinking rules.
(a) Random choice
An edge between the focal site and a randomly chosen site
is established. The randomly chosen site loses one of its
randomly selected neighbours. This scenario implies that
the focal individual searches randomly for a new interaction
partner, and the chosen new partner abandons one of its
connections at random (Fig 1a).
(b) Get rid of defectors
An edge between the focal site and a randomly chosen indi-
vidual is established. Both the focal individual and the ran-
domly chosen individual lose one of their defector
neighbours. If an individual does not have a defecting
neighbour then a randomly chosen cooperating neighbour is
lost (Fig 1b).
(c) A friend of my friend is my friend
The focal individual tries to establish a link with one of its
cooperating neighbour's neighbour. First a cooperating
neighbour is selected randomly (or a random individual if
none of them cooperates), then one of its neighbours is
selected randomly. The focal individual will establish a
connection with this individual. The selected new interac-
tion partner loses one of its defecting neighbours, if it has at
least one such a neighbour, otherwise connection with a
randomly selected neighbour is deleted (Fig 1c). (We note
here that the linking update mechanisms used by Santos et
al. [61] is somehow similar to our update rule (b) and (c).)
In numerical simulations, we measured the fixation prob-
ability of a single cooperator at different levels of graph
dynamics (ω2, ω1), different average numbers of neighbours
(k), and variations in the benefit to cost ratio (b/c). The ini-
tial cooperator was placed in a randomly chosen node, and
individuals updated until the whole population consisted of
either cooperators or defectors. For each parameter combi-
nation we have made 1000 graphs, and on each graph the
simulation was repeated 1000 times. The total number of
repetitions was thus one million from which we computed
the average fixation probability of a single cooperator (ρc).
Since the fixation probability of a single neutral mutant
would be 1/N, fixation of cooperators is supported by evo-
lution if ρc > 1/N [40]). For most of the simulations N = 100
was used, except for Fig 3, where N = 100. Different popu-
lation sizes give the same qualitative results.
Authors' contributions
All authors participated in the design of the study and the writing of the manu-
script. ÁK implemented the model. GB and ÁK analyzed the data. All authors
read and approved the final manuscript.
Acknowledgements
Á.K. was a Lise Meitner Postdoctoral Fellow (M983-N18), and he is also grateful 
for the support from OTKA (D048406, NK73047). I.S. acknowledges support 
from the Hungarian Research Funds (TECT-OTKA NN71700).
Author Details
1Evolution and Ecology Program, International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis, Schlossplatz 1, A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria, 2Department of Plant 
Taxonomy and Ecology, Institute of Biology, Eötvös University, Pázmány Péter 
sétány 1/C, H-1117 Budapest, Hungary, 3Parmenides Center for the Study of 
Thinking, Kirchplatz 1, D-82049 Munich/Pullach, Germany, 4Department of 
Plant Taxonomy and Ecology, Research Group of Ecology and Theoretical 
P Pi j
j
ki
=
∑
1
Kun et al. BMC Evolutionary Biology 2010, 10:173
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2148/10/173
Page 9 of 10Biology, Eötvös University and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Pázmány 
Péter sétány 1/C, H-1117 Budapest, Hungary and 5Konrad Lorenz Institute, 
Adolf Lorenz Gasse 2, A-3422 Altenberg, Austria
References
1. Nowak MA: Five rules for the evolution of cooperation.  Science 2006, 
314:1560-1563.
2. Sachs JL, Mueller UG, Wilcox TP, Bull JJ: The evolution of cooperation.  
Quarterly Review of Biology 2004, 79:135-160.
3. Maynard Smith J, Szathmáry E: The Major Transition in Evolution.  
Oxford, UK: W.H. Freeman; 1995. 
4. West SA, Griffin AS, Gardner A: Social semantics: altruism, cooperation, 
mutualism, strong reciprocity and group selection.  J Evol Biol 2007, 
20:415-432.
5. Blundell GM, Ben-David M, Groves P, Bowyer RT, Geffen E: Kinship and 
sociality in coastal river otters: are they related?  Behav Ecol 2004, 
15(5):705-714.
6. Gompper ME, Gittleman JL, Wayne RK: Genetic relatedness, coalitions 
and social behaviour of white-nosed coatis, Nasua narica.  Animal 
Behaviour 1996, 53(4):781-797.
7. Smith JE, Memenis SK, Holekamp KE: Rank-related partner choice in the 
fission-fusion society of the spotted hyena (Crocuta crocuta).  
Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 2007, 61(5):753-765.
8. Langergraber KE, Mitani JC, Vigilant L: The limited impact of kinship on 
cooperation in wild chimpanzees.  Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2007.
9. Altmann J, Alberts SC, Haines SA, Dubachdagger J, Muruthi P, Coote T, 
Geffen E, Cheesman DJ, Mututua RS, Saiyalel SN, et al.: Behavior predicts 
genetic structure in a wild primate group.  Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 1996, 
93(12):5797-5801.
10. Klingel H: Social organization and reproduction in equids.  Journal of 
reproduction and fertility 1975:7-11.
11. Packer C, Gilbert DA, Pusey AE, O'Brieni SJ: A molecular genetic analysis 
of kinship and cooperation in African lions.  Nature 1991, 351:562-565.
12. Packer C, Pusey AE: Cooperation and competition within coalitions of 
male lions: kin selection or game theory?  Nature 1982, 296:740-742.
13. Clutton-Brock TH: Breeding together: kin selection and mutualism in 
cooperative vertebrates.  Science 2002, 296:69-72.
14. Forbes SH, Boyd DK: Genetic variation of naturally colonizing wolves in 
the Central Rocky Mountains.  Cons Biol 1996, 10(4):1082-1090.
15. Van Horn RC, Engh AL, Scribner KT, Funk SM, Holekamp KE: Behavioural 
structuring of relatedness in the spotted hyena (Crocuta crocuta) 
suggests direct fitness benefits of clan-level cooperation.  Molecular 
Ecology 2004, 13:449-158.
16. Trivers R: The evolution of reciprocal altruism.  Quarterly Review of Biology 
1971, 46:35-57.
17. Axelrod R, Hamilton WD: The evolution of cooperation.  Science 1981, 
211:1390-1396.
18. Nowak MA, May RM: Evolutionary games and spatial chaos.  Nature 
1992, 359:826-829.
19. Számadó S, Szalai F, Scheuring I: The effect of dispersal and 
neighbourhood in games of cooperation.  J Theor Biol 2008, 
253(2):221-227.
20. Lehmann L, Keller L, Sumpter DJT: The evolution of helping and harming 
on graphs: the return of the inclusive fitness effect.  J Evol Biol 2009, 
20(6):2284-2295.
21. Durell JL, Sneddon IA, O'Connell NE, Whitehead H: Do pigs form 
preferential associations?  Applied Animal Behaviour Science 2004, 89(1-
2):41-52.
22. Boydston EE, Kapheim KM, Szykman M, Holekamp KE: Individual 
variation in space use by female spotted hyenas.  Journal of 
Mammalogy 2003, 84(3):1006-1018.
23. Lusseau D, Wilson B, Hammond PS, Grellier K, Durban JW, Parsons KM, 
Barton TR, Thompson PM: Quantifying the influence of sociality on 
population structure in bottlenose dolphins.  J Anim Ecol 2006, 
75(1):14-24.
24. Ward AJ, Botham MS, Hoare DJ, James R, Broom M, Godin JG, Krause J: 
Association patterns and shoal fidelity in the three-spined stickleback.  
Proc Roy Soc Lond B 2002, 269(1508):2451-2455.
25. Croft DP, James R, Ward AJW, Botham MS, Mawdley D, Krause J: 
Assortative interactions and social networks in fish.  Oecologia 2005, 
143(2):211-219.
26. Croft DP, Krause J, James R: Social networks in the guppy (Poecilia 
reticulata).  Proc R Soc London Ser B 2004, 271(Suppl. 6):S516-S519.
27. Smith R: Instant messaging as a scale-free network.  2002. arXiv:cond-
mat/0206378v0206372 [cond-mat.stat-mech]
28. Ebel H, Mielsch L-I, Bornholdt S: Scale-free topology of e-mail networks.  
Phys Rev E 2002, 66:035103(R).
29. Barabási A-L, Jeong H, Neda Z, Ravasz E, Schubert A, Vicsek T: Evolution of 
the social network of scientific collaborations.  Physica A 2002, 
311(3):590-614.
30. Newman MEJ: The structure of scientific collaboration networks.  Proc 
Natl Acad Sci USA 2001, 98(2):404-409.
31. Ohtsuki H, Hauert C, Lieberman E, Nowak MA: A simple rule for the 
evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks.  Nature 2006, 
441:502-505.
32. Santos FC, Pacheco JM: Scale-free networks provide a unifying 
framework for the emergence of cooperation.  Physical Review Letters 
2005, 95:098104.
33. Santos FC, Pacheco JM, Lenaerts T: Evolutionary dynamics of social 
dilemmas in structured heterogeneous populations.  Proc Natl Acad Sci 
USA 2006, 103:3490-3494.
34. Broom M, Rychtár J: An analysis of the fixation probability of a mutant 
on special classes of non-directed graphs.  Proc Roy Soc Lond B 2008, 
464(2098):2609-2627.
35. Broom M, Hadjichrysanthou C, Rychtár J: Evolutionary games on graphs 
and the speed of the evolutionary process.  Proc Roy Soc Lond B 2010, 
466(2117):1327-1346.
36. Broom M, Rychtár J, Stadler B: Evolutionary dynamics on small-order 
graphs.  Journal of Interdisciplinary Mathematics 2009, 12:129-140.
37. Szolnoki A, Perc M, Danku Z: Towards effective payoffs in the prisoner's 
dilemma game on scale-free networks.  Physica A 2008, 387:2075-2082.
38. Santos FC, Pacheco JM: A new route to the evolution of cooperation.  J 
Evol Biol 2006, 19(3):726-733.
39. Weber S, Porto M: Efficiency based strategy spreading in the prisoner's 
dilemma game.  The European Physical Journal B 2009, 69(4):599-603.
40. Taylor C, Fudenberg D, Sasaki A, Nowak MA: Evolutionary game 
dynamics in finite populations.  Bull Math Biol 2004, 66:1621-1644.
41. Taylor PD, Day T, Wild G: Evolution of cooperation in a finite 
homogeneous graph.  Nature 2007, 447:469-472.
42. Couzin ID: Behavioral ecology: Social organization in fission-fusion 
societies.  Curr Biol 1996, 16(5):R169-R171.
43. Wittemeyer G, Douglas-Hamilton I, Getz WM: The socioecology of 
elephants: analysis of the processes creating multitiered social 
structures.  Animal behaviour 2005, 69(6):1357-1371.
44. Connor RC: Dolphin social intelligence: complex alliance relationships 
in bottlenose dolphins and a consideration of selective environments 
for extreme brain size evolution in mammals.  Philosophical Transaction 
of the Royal Society of London 2007, 362(1480):587-602.
45. Connor RC, Heithaus MR, Barre LM: Superalliance of bottlenose 
dolphins.  Nature 1999, 397:571-572.
46. Holekamp KE, Cooper SM, Katona CI, Berry NA, Frank LG, Smale L: Patterns 
of association among female spotted hyenas (Crocuta crocuta).  Journal 
of Mammalogy 1997, 78(1):55-64.
47. Lehmann J, Korstjens AH, Dunbar RIM: Fission-fusion social systems as a 
strategy for coping with ecological constraints: a primate case.  Evol 
Ecol 2007, 21:613-634.
48. Gowans S, Whitehead H, Hooker SK: Social organization in northern 
bottlenose whales, Hyperoodon ampullatus: not driven by deep-water 
foraging?  Animal behaviour 2001, 62:369-377.
49. Ramos-Fernández G: Vocal communication in a fission-fusion society: 
Do spider monkeys stay in touch with close associates?  International 
Journal of Primatology 2005, 26(5):1077-1092.
50. Ottensmeyer CA, Whitehead H: Behavioural evidence for social units in 
long-finned pilot whales.  Canadian J Zoology 2003, 81(8):1327-1338.
51. Daniel TA, Chiaradia A, Logan M, Quinn GP, Reina RD: Synchronized 
group association in little penguins, Eudyptula minor.  Animal behaviour 
2007, 74:1241-1248.
52. Kasper C, Voelkl B: A social network analysis of primate groups.  Primates 
2009, 50:343-356.
Received: 20 February 2010 Accepted: 11 June 2010 
Published: 11 June 2010
This article is available from: http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2148/10/173© 2010 Kun et al; icensee BioMed Central Ltd. is an Open Ac ss article distributed un er th  terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.BMC Evol tionary Biology 2010, 10:173
Kun et al. BMC Evolutionary Biology 2010, 10:173
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2148/10/173
Page 10 of 1053. Ramos-Fernández G, Boyer D, Gómez VP: A complex social structure with 
fission-fusion properties can emerge from a simple foraging model.  
Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 2006, 60(4):536-549.
54. Gero S, Bejder L, Whitehead H, Mann J, Connor RC: Behaviourally specific 
preferred associations in bottlenose dolphins, Tursiops spp.  Canadian J 
Zoology 2005, 83(12):1566-1573.
55. Sayigh LS, Tyack PL, Wells RS, Solow AR, Scott MD, Irvine AB: Individual 
recognition in wild bottlenose dolphins: a field test.  Animal behaviour 
1999, 57(1):41-50.
56. Griffiths AD, Magurran AE: Schooling preferences for familiar fish vary 
with group size in a wild guppy population.  Proc Roy Soc Lond B 1997, 
264(1381):547-551.
57. Engh AL, Siebert ER, Greenberg DA, Holekamp KE: Patterns of alliance 
formation and postconflict aggression indicate spotted hyaenas 
recognize third-party relationships.  Animal behaviour 2005, 
69(1):209-217.
58. Pacheco JM, Traulsen A, Nowak MA: Active linking in evolutionary 
games.  J Theor Biol 2006, 243(3):437-43.
59. Pacheco JM, Traulsen A, Ohtsuki H, Nowak MA: Repeated games and 
direct reciprocity under active linking.  J Theor Biol 2008, 250(4):723-731.
60. Pacheco JM, Traulsen A, Nowak MA: Coevolution of strategy and 
structure in complex networks with dynamical linking.  Physical Review 
Letters 2006, 97:258103.
61. Santos FC, Pacheco JM, Lenaerts T: Cooperation prevails when 
individuals adjust their social ties.  PloS Computational Biology 2006, 
2(10):e140.
62. Vukov J, Szabó G: Cooperation for volunteering and partially random 
partnerships.  Phys Rev E 2004, 69(3):036107.
63. Fu F, Chen X, Liu L, Wang L: Promotion of cooperation induced by the 
interplay between structure and game dynamics.  Physica A 2007, 
383(2):651-659.
64. Zimmermann MG, Eguiluz VM, San Miguel M, Spadaro A: Cooperation in 
an Adaptive Network'.  In Applications of Simulation to Social Sciences 
Edited by: Ballot G, Weisbuch G. Paris, France: Hermes Science 
Publications; 2000. 
65. Zimmermann MG, Eguiluz VM, San Miguel M: Coevolution of dynamical 
states and interactions in dynamic networks.  Phys Rev E 2004, 
69:065102.
66. Biely C, Dragosits K, Thurner S: The prisoner's dilemma on co-evolving 
networks under perfect rationality.  Physica D 2007, 228(1):40-48.
67. Santos FC, Pacheco JM, Lenaerts T: Cooperation prevails when 
individuals adjust their social ties.  PloS Computational Biology 2006, 
2:e140.
68. Thomas POR, Croft DP, Morrell LJ, Davis A, Faria JJ, Dyer JRG, Piyapong C, 
Ramnarnie I, Ruxton GD, Krause J: Does defection during anti predator 
inspection affect social structure in wild shoals of guppies?  Animal 
behaviour 2008, 75:43-53.
69. Kun Á, Scheuring I: Evolution of cooperation on dynamical graphs.  
BioSystems 2009, 96(1):65-68.
70. Kossinets G, Watts DJ: Empirical analysis of an evolving social network.  
Science 2006, 311(5757):88-90.
71. Sansom A, Cresswell W, Minderman J, Lind J: Vigilance benefits and 
competition costs in groups: do individual redshanks gain an overall 
foraging benefit?  Animal behaviour 2008, 75(6):1869-1875.
72. Schmidt PA, Mech LD: Wolf pack size and food acquisition.  Am Nat 1997, 
150(4):513-517.
73. Vucetich JA, Peterson RO, Waite TA: Raven scavenging favours group 
foraging in wolves.  Animal behaviour 2004, 67(6):1117-1126.
74. Voelkl B, Kasper C: Social structure of primate interaction networks 
facilitates the emergence of cooperation.  Biology Letters 2009, 
5(4):462-464.
75. Lehmann J, Boesch C: To fission or to fusion: effects of community size 
on wild chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes verus) social organization.  
Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 2004, 56(3):216.
76. Vonhof MJ, Whitehead H, Fenton MB: Analysis of Spix's disc-winged bat 
association patterns and roosting home ranges reveal a novel social 
structure among bats.  Animal behaviour 2004, 68(3):507-521.
77. Whitehead H: Investigating structure and temporal scale in social 
organisations using identified individuals.  Behav Ecol 1995, 
6(2):199-208.
78. Wells RS, Scott MD: Estimating bottlenose dolphin population 
parameters from individual identification and capture-release 
techniques.  Individual recognition of cetaceans: Use of photo-identification 
and other techniques to estimate population parameters. SC/A88/P23 
1990:407-415.
79. Karczmarski L, Würsig B, Gailey G, Larson KW, Vanderlip C: Spinner 
dolphins in a remote Hawaiian atoll: social grouping and population 
structure.  Behav Ecol 2005, 16(4):675-685.
80. Fu F, Hauert C, Nowak MA, Wang L: Reputation-based partner choice 
promotes cooperation in social networks.  Phys Rev E 2008, 78:026117.
81. Tanimoto J: Promotion of cooperation through co-evolution of 
networks and strategy in a 2 × 2 game.  Physica A 2009, 388(6):953-960.
82. Sundaresan S, Fischhoff I, Dushoff J, Rubenstein D: Network metrics 
reveal differences in social organization between two fission-fusion 
species, Grevy's zebra and onager.  Oecologia 2007, 151(1):140-149.
83. Kirkpatrick RC, Long YC, Zhong T, Xiao L: Social organization and range 
use in the Yuannan Snub-nosed monkey Rhinopithecus bieti.  
International Journal of Primatology 1998, 19(1):13-51.
84. Albert R, Barabási A-L: Statistical mechanics of complex networks.  
Reviews of Modern Physics 2002, 74:47-97.
85. Dangalchev C: Generation models for scale-free networks.  Physica A 
2004, 338(3-4):659-671.
86. Ohtsuki H, Nowak MA: Evolutionary stability on graphs.  J Theor Biol 
2008, 251:698-707.
87. Nowak MA, Sigmund K: A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that 
outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma game.  Nature 1993, 
364:56-58.
88. Farkas I, Derényi I, Palla G, Vicsek T: Equilibrium statistical mechanics of 
network structures.  Lecture Notes in Physics 2004, 650:163-187.
89. Maslov S, Sneppen K: Specificity and stability in topology of protein 
networks.  Science 2002, 296(5569):910-913.
90. Xulvi-Brunet R, Pietsch W, Sokolov IM: Correlations in scale-free 
networks: Tomography and percolation.  Phys Rev E 2003, 68:036119.
91. Gompper ME: Sociality and asociality in white-nosed coatis (Nasua 
narica): foraging costs and benefits.  Behav Ecol 1996, 7(3):254-263.
92. Hass CC, Valenzuela D: Anti-predator benefits of group living in white-
nosed coatis (Nasua narica).  Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 2002, 
51(6):570-578.
93. Lusseau D: The emergent properties of a dolphin social network.  Proc 
Roy Soc Lond B 2003, 270(Suppl. 2):S186-S188.
94. Baird RW, Dill LM: Ecological and social determinants of group size in 
transient killer whales.  Behav Ecol 1996, 7(4):408-416.
doi: 10.1186/1471-2148-10-173
Cite this article as: Kun et al., Cooperators Unite! Assortative linking pro-
motes cooperation particularly for medium sized associations BMC Evolution-
ary Biology 2010, 10:173
